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ABSTRACT 
 
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was built in the early 1960’s as a water storage reservoir for hydro-electric energy production.  The 
reservoir was created by blasting rock from the top of Proffit Mountain.  The rock debris generated was then used to construct a kidney 
shaped earthen embankment atop the mountain.  The reservoir is located in Reynolds County near the town of Lesterville, Missouri.  The 
Upper Reservoir was approximately 95 feet in depth and covered a surface area of roughly 55 acres.  The reservoir had the capacity to hold 
nearly 1.5 billion gallons of water. The Upper reservoir underwent a catastrophic failure on the morning of December 14th, 2005 releasing 
most of its stored water down the northwest side of Proffit Mountain.  An approximate 700-feet wide breach occurred along the northwest 
radius of the rock-fill dike, causing severe damage to state park property.  No fatalities resulted from the failure events.  This paper 
evaluates different failure mechanisms of the reservoir based on three distinct failure hypotheses.  Conclusions are then made based on the 
analyses and discussion of each mechanism, categorized in terms of the likely contribution to the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir failure.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the early morning hours of December 14, 2005, the Taum 
Sauk Upper Reservoir rock-fill dike underwent a catastrophic 
failure, releasing more than a billion gallons of water down the 
northwest side of Proffit Mountain.  The release of water 
downstream ripped the land of existing vegetation and soil cover 
and the resulting wall of water demolished one residence directly 
in the flood path.  Severe flash flooding was experienced on the 
East Fork of the Black River, including Johnson’s Shut-Ins 
geological features and Johnson’s Shut-Ins State Park 
campground.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the consequences of the 
water release from the Upper Reservoir.  Figure 1 displays 
downstream sedimentation and a portion of the downstream flow 
path.  Figure 2 displays the residence that was demolished by the 
flash flood waters. 
 
The breach occurred along the northwest radius of the Upper 
Reservoir over a distance of about 680 feet at the crest and 
through the entire height of the dike.  Figure 3 illustrates the 
breach area of the rock-fill dike.  Water began overtopping the 
reservoir on the morning of the failure.  Overtopping at specific 
locations around the perimeter of the Upper Reservoir and 
possible failure mechanisms associated with the failure events 
after initiation of overtopping, are within the scope of this study. 
The cause of overtopping is of importance but is not within the 
scope of this evaluation.   
 
The Taum Sauk power plant is located in Reynolds County, 
Missouri, approximately 90 miles southwest of St. Louis, 
Missouri, in the Johnson’s Shut-Ins Quadrangle. The power plant 
facilities are approximately 4.5 miles northwest of Lesterville, 
Missouri, and approximately 1 mile east of Highway N.   
 
Fig. 1. The upper reservoir breach and a portion of the flow 
path (photo courtesy of J. Spooner, 2005) 
 
On December 15, 2005, select NHMI members embarked on a 
preliminary site reconnaissance in response to the Taum Sauk 
Upper Reservoir failure.  Access to the site was limited; however 
one member of the team was granted access to the Upper 
Reservoir area and allowed to document what he witnessed.  
Other team members were involved with mapping the general 
flood water extent in the lower regions of the flow regime near 
Missouri State Highway N and the entrance to Johnson’s Shut-
Ins State Park.  All members witnessed first hand the effects that 
the flood waters had on the surrounding landscape and also 
realized the destructive power of such an event.  Figures 1 
through 3 are photographs taken during the initial site 
reconnaissance. Additional details related to the site 
reconnaissance were published by Witt and Hoffman (2005). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Remnants of the Park Ranger’s residence (Hoffman, 
2005).  
 
 
Fig. 3. View of breach looking northwest across reservoir 
(Hoffman, 2005). 
 
Several efforts were made to collect data for this study.  The 
USGS Mid Continent Geographic Science Center (MCGSC) 
contracted an aerial survey on December 16, 2005.  The aerial 
survey used Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) to capture the 
site topography after the failure events.  The LiDAR data was 
made available to the University of Missouri – Rolla for this 
evaluation.  Additionally, the MoDNR conducted an elevation 
survey to measure the remaining concrete parapet wall panels.  
This survey was referenced to an existing benchmark to compare 
data with previous surveys.  These elevation data were made 
available for this evaluation and are presented in Appendix B of 
Gehring (2006).  Although information and data were not easily 
accessible, an adequate amount was collected and key 
assumptions were made that allowed the progression of this 
evaluation. 
 
The scope of this evaluation involved the post failure 
reconnaissance visit to the Upper Reservoir system and 
analytical studies based on data published by others.  It included 
development of several failure mechanism hypotheses, analyses 
of the stability of the structural and geotechnical components 
under the assumes loading conditions, discussion of the 
relevance of each proposed failure mechanism, and classification 
of each proposed failure mechanism considering their respective 
probability of occurrence.  In order to understand this grand 
failure case history a thorough description of the geological, 
geotechnical and structural conditions at the site are necessary. 
BACKGROUND 
 
Geologic Setting 
 
The St. Francois Mountains region is a unique area consisting of 
Missouri’s oldest landscape. During the Precambrian time 
igneous granite rock formed as a molten magma crystallized 
deep within the earth’s surface. Volcanoes closer to the surface 
also began to erupt large quantities of pyroclastic flows and 
rhyolitic lava (Unklesbay and Vineyard, 1992). Thick layers of 
pyroclastic materials were deposited throughout the region as 
either air fall or ash flow tuff.  Residual heat from the eruptions 
often melted or “welded” the pyroclastic ash fragments together 
and cooled to form a hard igneous rock known as welded tuff.  
Most of the ash flow tuff present in the Proffit Mountain region 
is reddish in color and of felsic or rhyolitic composition. Various 
rhyolites and tuffs have a cumulative thickness of several 
thousand feet in the St. Francois Mountains.  Many large bodies 
of reddish to grayish granite are included within this material. 
 
After the decrease and eventual halt of volcanic activity during 
the Precambrian time, the area was subjected to the Ozark dome 
uplift (Unklesbay and Vineyard, 1992). The uplift, as well as 
erosion, formed the igneous knobs and ridges common to the St. 
Francois Mountains of today.  When the Cambrian seas began to 
rise, much of the region became blanketed by water, leaving the 
igneous knobs and ridges as highpoints or islands.  Deposition of 
sedimentary rocks during this period left thick layers of 
sandstone and carbonate sediments on the sea floor that draped 
the slopes of the igneous highpoints and knobs. 
 
Regression of the Cambrian seas exposed the younger 
sedimentary deposits and the igneous highpoints.  Erosion and 
weathering of the Cambrian rocks cut distinct drainage patterns 
through the sedimentary deposits.  Present day drainage patterns 
preferentially cut through sedimentary deposits down to 
underlying steep granite ridges.  These ridges resist the effects of 
weathering and erosion more than the younger, softer, 
sedimentary rocks.  When rivers cut down into these ancient 
bedrock ridges, their flow is locally restricted, forming steep, 
closed in chutes called shut-ins.  Johnson’s Shut-Ins on the East 
Fork of the Black River is an example of this type of feature, and 
is located below the Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir.  As with the 
most of the Ozark Plateau, the St. Francois Mountains were not 
glaciated during the Pleistocene.  Lack of glaciation preserved 
many ancient, deeply weathered zones of bedrock and soil, 
which are locally present throughout the region. 
 
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir 
 
The following is a summary of the components that comprise the 
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir.  The information was obtained 
from a report provided by AmerenUE and made available soon 
after the failure (Rizzo, 2006). This evaluation focuses on the 
upper reservoir at the top of Proffit Mountain. Figure 4 illustrates 
an aerial view of the Upper Reservoir with locations of various 
components discussed below.  The upper reservoir dike is about 
6,500 feet long and closes to form a kidney-shaped reservoir.  
The concrete-faced dumped rockfill dam (CFRD) had a 
maximum height in the range of 85 feet above the base of the 
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reservoir.  The base of the reservoir is around elevation 1505 
feet.  At the top of the CFRD a 10-foot-high concrete parapet 
wall rests on the inside edge of the 12-foot wide crest.   Survey 
data indicate that the parapet wall panels have settled over time 
and at some locations are as much as 2 feet lower than the design 
elevation. 
 
A horseshoe shaped access tunnel exists through the northern 
side of the dike and provides access to the reservoir floor.  The 
upstream face was fitted with a hinged steel bulkhead gate that 
opens into the reservoir.  The inlet/outlet conduit consists of a 
451 feet deep, 27.2 feet diameter vertical shaft shaped at the top 
as a typical ‘morning glory.’  The top 110-feet of the shaft is 
concrete lined and connects to a 4,765 feet long, 25 feet 
diameter, unlined horseshoe tunnel. The horseshoe tunnel ties 
into a steel lined horizontal tunnel roughly 1,807 feet long and 
18.5 feet in diameter. A short penstock then splits the steel lined 
tunnel and directs flow to the pump-generating plant. (Rizzo, 
2006) 
 
Spillways are typically specified to protect dams, dikes, and 
reservoirs from the potential effects of overtopping water.  The 
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was designed without a spillway 
system.  One possible reason for not specifying a spillway 
system for the reservoir is the lack of topographic drainage area 
contribution to the total inflow into the Upper Reservoir.  The 
reservoir’s only contributions to inflow were from the intended 
pump-back procedures for filling and direct rainfall on the Upper 
Reservoir itself.  This means that overtopping could occur from 
over-pumping/overfilling or excess rainfall with the latter being 
highly improbable.  Furthermore, to prevent overtopping of the 
rock-fill dike by over-pumping, a system of redundant water 
level instruments was specified in the design. 
 
 
Figure 4. Aerial view of Upper Reservoir. 
 
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was constructed in the early 
1960’s. It is important to note that design and construction 
practices today were not the state-of-the-practice in the early 
1960’s.  The following is a partial list the specifications 
incorporated into the construction of the Upper Reservoir (Rizzo, 
2006).  
1. Rock was dumped and re-positioned by sluicing with water 
(jets) from monitors 
2. Fines were removed by sluicing after rock was dumped 
into position 
3. Foundation was prepared by removal of most deleterious 
materials by dozers.  A note on the Drawings that applies 
to the 70 feet nearest the upstream toe reads as follows: 
“Strip to sound rock with not more than 2 inches 
(average) of dirt.  This dirt to be thoroughly saturated 
before placing.” 
“Remove topsoil and loose, unstable, altered material as 
far as possible with bulldozer” 
4. Parapet walls were used to retain water on an “everyday” 
basis 
5. Grout curtain was installed to a depth of about 20 feet.  
There is no evidence of the design basis. 
 
No conclusions based on adequacies of construction practices 
and/or procedures are addressed herein, but it is important to note 
the dam remained functional throughout its 40 plus years of 
service. 
 
Remediation and Upgrades 
 
Initial filling of the Upper Reservoir occurred in 1963.  Leakage 
from the Upper Reservoir was a re-occurring problem and 
concern since the initial filling.  For example, at one time a 
sudden increase in seepage was experienced and emergency 
measures were taken to remediate the situation.  The remediation 
required plugging two holes in the reservoir floor with concrete. 
Another episode of increased leakage occurred three days later 
resulting in complete shut down and mandatory repair.  The 
repair required excavating a long trench down to bedrock and 
then backfilling the excavated trench with concrete.  Throughout 
the following years a number of repairs were made focusing 
more on leakage through the horizontal and vertical joints in the 
concrete liner with an emphasis placed on the joints between the 
concrete liner and bedrock, the joint at the upstream toe of the 
parapet wall, and the joint between the concrete liner and the 
plinth (FERC,2006). 
 
The Taum Sauk power plant began to be used more extensively 
after increasing plant efficiency in 1999. After increasing plant 
efficiency, higher rates of leakage were witnessed until the 
installation of a geosynthetic liner in 2004.  The liner was placed 
over the original upstream concrete liner.  The geosynthetic 
membrane on the interior side slopes was 80 mil thick High 
Density Polyethylene (HDPE).  During the 12 months prior to 
the failure events and after the installation of the geosynthetic 
liner, observed leakage was significantly reduced (FERC, 2006). 
  
 
HYPOTHESES OF FAILURE MECHANISMS 
 
#1 - Rising Phreatic Surface and stability failure 
 
The following summarizes failure mechanism #1: As 
overtopping of the Upper Reservoir rock-fill dike was initiated, 
water spilling over the concrete parapet wall infiltrated into the 
dike.  The resultant increase of water within the dike 
subsequently caused the phreatic surface to rise within the rock-
fill.  The rising phreatic surface exerted excess pore pressures 
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within the rock-fill material, consequently reducing the effective 
stresses acting on the bedrock and rock-fill interface. The 
reduced effective stresses lowered the shear strength of the rock-
fill material.  The reduction of effective stresses caused either a 
global slope stability or localized toe slope stability failure on the 
downstream slope of the Upper Reservoir. 
 
If a localized toe stability failure occurred due to the 
aforementioned reduction of effective stresses, the global 
stability of the reservoir would be sufficiently weakened to the 
point of global slope stability failure.  The capacity of the rock-
fill dike to hold back the contained water, after either case of 
slope failure, would have been severely compromised. Complete 
failure due to a rising phreatic surface and reduced slope stability 
could have resulted.  Figure 5 illustrates sketches of each stage of 
the proposed failure mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
ig. 5. Failure mechanism #1.  
ope instability, (c) 
 scale). 
#2 - Downstream Toe Erosion and stability failure
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he following summarizes failure mechanismT
overtopping of the Upper Reservoir was initiated, water spilling 
over the concrete parapet wall was allowed to flow down and 
along the downstream slope surface of the dike.  If the water 
flowing along the surface reached the toe of the slope with a 
sufficient flow rate, a hydraulic jump could have been formed. 
Once a hydraulic jump formed, erosion could have been initiated 
at the downstream toe of the reservoir.  This erosion process 
removed rock-fill material beginning at the downstream toe and 
progressively moved upward along the slope.  The removal of 
material is similar to that of the localized downstream toe 
stability and could have affected the global slope stability of the 
dike.  Once a sufficient amount of material was removed, the 
downstream global slope stability was severely compromised to 
the point of failure.  The capacity of the rock-fill dike to hold 
back the contained water, after global slope failure, would have 
been severely compromised. Complete failure due to erosion at 
the toe and reduced slope stability could have resulted.  Figure 6 
illustrates sketches of each stage of the proposed failure 
mechanism.  
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(a) water flowing across downstream slope, (b
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#3 - Scour Undermining and parapet wall failure 
 
The following summarizes failure mechanism #3: As 
overtopping of the reservoir was initiated, water spilling over the 
concrete parapet wall caused erosion and scouring at the 
downstream crest of the dike.  This process began to undermine 
the concrete parapet wall foundation. As undermining and 
scouring progressed, the rock-fill material was transported down 
the slope.  Once the undermining process removed a sufficient 
amount of rock-fill, the stability of the concrete parapet wall and 
the shear capacity of the rock-fill directly below the wall became 
severely compromised to the point of either wall failure and/or 
shear failure.  After the aforementioned wall/crest failure(s), 
more water (10-feet) and consequently more flow was released in 
the area of the breach.  The additional flow continued the erosion 
process down to the toe of the reservoir yielding the catastrophic 
failure.  Figure 7 illustrates sketches of each stage of the 
proposed failure mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Failure mechanism #3. (not to scale). 
(a) overtopping water, (b) scouring and undermining, (c) 
parapet wall failure, (d) catastrophic failure with progressive 
erosion, same as Fig. 5(c) 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF FAILURE HYPOTHESES RELATED TO 
ANALYSES 
 
The analyses of each hypothesis made in this study were 
included in much detail in Gehring (2006).  The following 
sections summarize the main points of the analyses and present 
related discussions. 
 
Rising Phreatic Surface and stability failure 
 
Assuming a free draining rock-fill, the possibility that a phreatic 
surface could rise to the extent of impending reservoir failure is 
unlikely.  However, the presence of fines was noted in certain 
areas of the dike by Rizzo (2006).  Given the noted fines content 
in the rock-fill, a phreatic surface rise was proposed as a failure 
mechanism.  A rise in phreatic surface elevation within the dike 
would cause a decrease in effective stresses throughout the rock-
fill mass underwater.  The ability of the rock-fill material to 
dissipate excess pore pressures radially from the sections of 
overtopping makes it difficult to comprehend the rise in phreatic 
surface conditions needed to initiate global slope instability, 
localized toe slope instability, or both localized toe and global 
slope instability.  However, the condition of a rising phreatic 
surface was analyzed in terms of localized toe and global slope 
stability.   
 
The stability analyses show that for a condition with no excess 
pore pressures present within the dike, safety factors calculated 
using the Spencer method were 1.8 and 1.9 for localized toe and 
global slope stability, respectively.  These factors are acceptable 
when compared to the minimum design recommendation safety 
factor of 1.5.  When using the more conservative Bishop method 
the safety factor against global instability was close to 1.6 and 
the safety factor against localized toe slope instability was most 
nearly 1.5.  Both factors are adequate when compared with 
design standards. 
 
The phreatic surface was incrementally raised for the analyses.  
The safety factors began to drop, as expected, for both localized 
toe and global slope stability.  A safety factor of nearly 1.5 was 
obtained for both slope stability conditions when the phreatic 
surface reached a theoretical elevation of roughly 50 feet above 
the upstream toe of the reservoir. The Spencer method was used 
for calculations. The calculated safety factors were still adequate 
when compared with design standards.  The calculated safety 
factor for both slope stability conditions did not reach 1.0 until a 
theoretical rise in phreatic surface elevation was approximately 
80 feet above the upstream toe of the reservoir. A safety factor of 
1.0 corresponds to impending failure.  
 
Moreover, before installation of the geosynthetic liner in 2004, 
information suggests that seepage from the Upper Reservoir 
became increasingly more costly as the life of the reservoir 
increased.  It is noted that the reservoir remained stable before 
installation of the geosynthetic liner even with seepage pore 
pressures allowed to build up.  This note suggests that the 
reservoir had experienced effects similar to a rising phreatic 
surface in the past. Although stability may have been in jeopardy 
during times of increased seepage, performance history suggests 
CONCRETE PARAPET WALL 
OVERFLOWING WATER 
ROCK-FILL 
(c) 
OVERTOPPING WATER 
ROCK-FILL 
BEDROCK 
(a) 
CONCRETE PARAPET WALL 
OVERTOPPING WATER 
SCOURING AND UNDERMINING 
ROCK-FILL
(b) 
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the reservoir could withstand some amount of excess pore water 
pressure build up.  
 
Given the time frame of the failure events, it is unlikely that the 
phreatic surface elevation in the area of the breach reached an 
impending failure condition.  From the aforementioned 
discussion and the performed analyses, a rising phreatic surface 
condition was not likely responsible for the rock-fill dike failure. 
 
Downstream toe erosion and stability failure 
 
Erosive and scour forces are difficult to quantify in terms of 
magnitude and extent.  With erosion and scour, the contribution 
of flow characteristics causes changes in channel characteristics 
and changes in channel characteristics causes changes in flow 
characteristics.  This reveals that the erosion and scouring 
processes are not independently controlled by flow 
characteristics nor independently controlled by channel 
characteristics.  In other words, flow characteristics affect 
channel characteristics and channel characteristics affect flow 
characteristics.  An attempt was made to identify the energy 
needed to initiate erosion at the downstream toe assuming that no 
changes in channel characteristics occurred on the downstream 
slope of the dike until the overtopping flow of water reached the 
downstream toe of the reservoir. 
 
Through the analyses it was determined that a sufficient flow 
could have existed to mobilize granular material at the toe and 
initiate the erosion process.  If this process occurred it would 
have severely weakened the rock-fill dike structure in terms of 
global slope stability.  This effect would be similar to the effect 
that a localized toe failure would have on global slope stability. 
In areas where the overtopping flow was not sufficient to keep 
mobilized granular material suspended, deposition of the material 
along the downstream slope and along the downstream toe 
occurred.  Evidence of an accumulation of granular material at 
the toe of the dike in non-failed, overtopped, areas suggests that 
a similar condition may have occurred in the breach segment 
before failure. 
 
Analyses were conducted to quantify the possibility that 
overtopping water could initiate the erosion process along the 
downstream slope.  The infinite slope analyses revealed that the 
downstream slope was marginally safe with respect to sloughing 
and planar failure and exhibited a safety factor of 1.1.  Flow 
across the surface of the downstream slope or infiltration as 
water flowed down the slope could have reduced the safety 
factor and increased the effects of erosion, leading to either 
increased crest erosion, reduction of the embankment cross-
section, and/or increased toe erosion. 
 
The possibility that erosion could take place at the downstream 
toe of the Upper Reservoir existed given the condition that no 
material mobilization occurred at the downstream crest or along 
the downstream slope as water flowed downstream.  The 
aforementioned discussion and post-failure evidence in other 
areas that experienced overtopping discount the likelihood of this 
process occurring. From the discussion and analyses, 
downstream toe erosion was likely not responsible for the rock-
fill dike failure. 
 
Scour undermining of parapet wall 
 
The ability of the concrete parapet wall to withstand the applied 
loads (mainly water pressure) is paramount to the structural 
integrity of the entire Upper Reservoir rock-fill dike structure.  If 
the parapet wall failed in any way, the sequential flow of water 
would have continued the erosion process from the top to the 
bottom of the rock-fill dike, resulting in catastrophic failure.   
Two mechanisms were proposed that could have lead to the 
instability of the parapet wall.  They were overturning and 
sliding stability of the wall itself and shear failure of the rock-fill 
directly beneath the base of the wall. 
 
The analyses revealed that the concrete parapet wall, before 
overtopping initiated and during the operational life of the 
structure, could effectively withstand the applied loads.  The 
operational life safety factor against overturning was most nearly 
2.4.  The operational life safety factor against sliding along the 
base was most nearly 1.5.  Both analyses did not consider the 
geosynthetic liner connections that could increase respective 
safety factors.  When compared to typical design criteria the 
computed safety factors were satisfactory. 
 
Analyses were performed to quantify overtopping water flow and 
scouring and undermining at the downstream crest.  Figure 8 
illustrates the concrete parapet wall profile, the probable 
elevation at which overtopping started, and the probable 
maximum water elevation during the failure events.  The 
analyses revealed that overtopping flow could initiate scouring 
and undermining.  The extent of scouring and undermining 
varied as a function of the parapet wall crest elevation and 
overtopping flow depth at various locations.  Flow depth was 
defined as the height of water flowing over the parapet wall 
sections. 
 
The segment between panel 70 and panel 74 experienced a 
greater effect from scouring and undermining than the location 
between panel 43 and panel 54.  Due to the lower wall crest 
elevations between panel 70 and panel 74 and the resulting 
higher flow rates exiting the reservoir at this location.  Also, the 
segment between panel 70 and panel 74 began overtopping 
before the segment between panel 43 and panel 54.  The time 
factor associated with scouring and undermining caused less 
scouring and undermining between panel 43 and panel 54.  The 
maximum differential settlement between the two locations was 
approximately 0.2-feet. If the parapet wall segments in the 
breach area experienced settlements similar to panel segments 70 
through 74, the effects of scouring and undermining could have 
been similar. 
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Parapet Wall Elevation Profile
1598.80 
Fig. 8. Parapet wall elevation profile (source: MoDNR data). 
 
 
Based on calculations presented in Gehring (2006), there was a 
relatively high potential for the rock-fill material at the crest to 
be scoured and eroded.  To evaluate the effects of scour 
undermining on the stability of the parapet wall, an incremental 
approach to the extent of undermining was applied to sliding and 
overturning stability calculations.  As expected, the resulting 
safety factors decreased with increased scour undermining.  A 
safety factor of 1.0 was obtained for overturning stability when 
the scour undermining distance was roughly 3.3 feet, measured 
from the downstream toe of the parapet wall.  Similarly, a safety 
factor of 1.0 was obtained for sliding stability when the scour 
undermining distance was roughly 2.0 feet, measured from the 
downstream toe of the parapet wall. A safety factor of 1.0 
corresponds to impending failure.  The analyses results 
supplement visual evidence of scouring and undermining within 
non-failed overtopped areas.  If wall crest elevations in the 
breach area were similar to other overtopped segments, the 
effects of scouring and undermining could have been similar. 
 
As undermining, scouring, and erosion progressed, the 
possibility existed that enough rock fill material was removed 
directly beneath the base of the wall to cause a localized soil 
shear failure.  If localized soil shear failure occurred, the effects 
would have been similar to sliding or overturning instability of 
the wall.  Both proposed circumstances could have caused wall 
failure, leading to the eventual complete discharge of stored 
water in the reservoir.  The near 700-feet wide breach suggests, 
in the opinion of the writer, a sudden collapse of parapet wall 
segments and continued erosion and scouring down to bedrock. 
 
Although it is difficult to assess which failure mechanism (i.e. 
overturning and sliding or localized shear) occurred first, the 
analyses support the concrete parapet wall instability and 
subsequent erosion of the rock-fill dike as a possible mode of 
catastrophic failure.  From the discussion and analyses, the 
concrete parapet wall failure and resulting erosion of the rock-fill 
dike were likely mechanisms for the reservoir failure.  
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The events that lead to the failure of the Taum Sauk Upper 
Reservoir the morning of December 14, 2005 provided an 
opportunity to the academic and professional communities to 
learn from this interesting case study and provided a platform to 
bring dam safety into the regional and national spotlight.  The 
desire to learn comes after realizing the potential for loss of life 
and the realistic loss of property value. 
 
The scope of this academic exercise did not involve evaluating 
the causes leading up to the failure events nor does it attempt to 
address the causes pertaining to why the Upper Reservoir was 
allowed to overtop.  The scope of this exercise was to 
systematically evaluate several postulated failure mechanisms 
and attempt to categorize each mechanism in terms of their 
relevance to the failure events. 
 
Without actually witnessing the failure events as they occurred, 
only speculations can be made in terms of the true cause, or 
combination of causes, leading to the catastrophic failure of the 
Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir.  In their own right, each proposed 
failure mechanism could have contributed solely to the failure 
events, or a combination of all three proposed mechanisms could 
be the culprit, or another failure mechanism not contemplated 
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could be responsible.  However, the phenomenon common to the 
three proposed failure mechanisms was overtopping water.  
Without water overtopping the Upper Reservoir, all three of the 
proposed failure mechanisms would be invalid. 
 
Although each mechanism could lead to failure, the analyses and 
observations indicate that some failure mechanisms were more 
likely than others.  The likelihood of occurrence, with 1 being the 
most likely and 3 being the least likely, is as follows. 
1. Scouring and undermining of parapet wall. 
2. Downstream toe erosion and stability failure. 
3. Rising phreatic surface and stability failure. 
 
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir, for all practical purposes, 
remained stable and operational throughout its 40 plus year 
service life.  Circumstances such as increased seepage rates and 
surficial downstream slope instability were noticed in the past 
and may have decreased the overall stability of the Upper 
Reservoir in certain areas.  The presence and migration of fine 
material may have caused greater susceptibility to erosion in 
certain areas of the dike.  However, the presence and effects of 
fine material are not presented in this evaluation. 
 
Acceptable construction practices during the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s would not be deemed satisfactory by today’s 
standards of practice. However, retrofitting all structures to 
accommodate the ever changing state-of-the-practice would be 
impractical.  Given the stability of the Upper Reservoir over the 
40 plus year operational life, even with seepage pressures being 
present before installation of the geosynthetic liner, inadequate 
construction practices were likely not the cause of the Taum 
Sauk Upper Reservoir Failure. 
 
Spillways are typically specified to protect dams, dikes, and 
reservoirs from the potentially devastating effects of overflowing 
water.  The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir was designed without a 
spillway system.  One possible reason for not specifying a 
spillway system for the Upper Reservoir was the lack of 
topographic drainage area contribution to the total inflow.  The 
reservoir’s only contributions to inflow were the intended pump-
back procedures for filling and direct rainfall on the Upper 
Reservoir itself.  This means that overtopping could be contrived 
from over-pumping/overfilling or excess rainfall with the later 
being highly improbable.  Some form of spillway system could 
prevent this catastrophic failure event. 
 
In conclusion, the true cause of the December 14, 2005 failure 
incident may never be ascertained but valuable insight and 
knowledge into the most likely failure mechanism(s) contributing 
to the event from research, study, and evaluation can be used to 
prevent future catastrophes of this magnitude.  An understanding 
of failure events can be used as a tool to help protect the general 
safety and well being of society as a whole against future 
possibilities of dam, dike, and reservoir breaches.  The Taum 
Sauk Upper Reservoir failure serves as a lesson for Missouri as 
well as the nation in regards to the importance of dam, dike, and 
reservoir safety. 
Taum Sauk Today 
 
The future of the Taum Sauk upper reservoir facility is now well 
defined.  The owner, AmerenUE, was given authorization to 
rebuild at the same location.  The current plans are to build a 
roller-compacted concrete (RCC) reservoir dam.  The design will 
employ the latest in overflow structures, monitoring and control 
systems, seismic design criteria and other safety features.  This 
new facility will be built using the existing materials from the 
existing embankment dam.  The announcement to start the 
restoration project was made in late 2007 and as soon the testing, 
analysis and design are finalized construction will start.  More 
information can be found at the owners website, click on:  
http://www.ameren.com/TaumSauk/
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